- OVERVIEW -

For both dramatic effect and historical significance, “DEFCON 1” could begin with several short clips from the 1983 film “War Games,” starting with the scene of the commanding general at NORAD watching the nuclear threat board light up and giving the order to go to “DEFCON 1,” establishing early on the reference to the show’s title. (It will later be explained why the DEFCON system was instituted and how it stands for our nation's "DEFense readiness CONdition.") The show could then cut to the scene of the the two U.S. Air Force officers—one of them played by John Spencer (of "West Wing" fame), the other by Michael Madsen ("Reservoir Dogs" and "Kill Bill, Volumes I & II)")—about to launch a missile, when Spencer’s character refuses, at gunpoint, to turn the key that could lead to a strike which would, in his words, “kill 20,000,000 people.” The show will later emphasize how the movie, among other nuclear war films, had a very real impact on government policies and history, itself.

After the cold open, the host and other experts could explain from the start the relevance of this show and the significance of actions like the Russians recent launching of a new, hypersonic ICBM (named, ominously enough, "Satan 2"). Experts could also provide the historical context that, between the early 1960s and the late 1980s, a nuclear war between the United States and the (then) Soviet Union was considered quite possible—and, at times, almost inevitable, leading to the the deaths of tens of millions of people, if not the end of all humanity. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the chance of a nuclear war seemed increasingly unlikely. But now the United States and Russia are once again adversaries and potentially on the precipice of a major war. The show could also tease, early on, the fact that viewers will hear from former Presidents about what it was like to receive the nuclear codes and to have the power to engage in a full-scale nuclear war. But first the show will give viewers a succinct history of how these weapons came to be....

Possible VO with host saying, “It all started with a letter…” and then going into how one month before German troops stormed into Poland, the physicist Albert Einstein wrote President Franklin D. Roosevelt about “extremely powerful bombs of a new type" that could be constructed using radioactive materials. After the United States declared war against Japan, FDR put into motion what would become known as the “Manhattan Project" (named so because the original researchers and scientists were working in Manhattan, NY, before the main testing was conducted in New Mexico). When FDR died and Vice President Harry Truman became the Commander in Chief, he didn’t know about the atomic bombs or even the program to create them. (And although Albert Einstein had initially endorsed the project, he later denounced nuclear weapons.)

Upon learning about the atomic bombs, President Truman ordered that they be dropped on Japanese cities that, he was informed, were believed to have some military or industrial significance, and Hiroshima, Kokura, Nagasaki, and Niigata were all selected. The military only had two bombs at the time ("Fat Man" and "Little Boy"), so each primary city had a back-up. Hiroshima was destroyed on August 6, 1945 (post-blast photo, right), and Nagasaki three days later. (Kokura would have been hit instead of Nagasaki but weather conditions caused the latter to become the ultimate target.) Japan surrendered on August 14, 1945. While there was little controversy in the immediate aftermath of the war, over time Truman was criticized for ordering the bombings, which killed an estimated 200,000 civilians. Truman argued that many times more that number would have died in an Allied land invasion of Japan. (This is obviously a very sensitive issue, so it will be addressed carefully and in more detail in the show.)

Although the Soviet Union had the scientific brainpower to create its own nuclear weapons, they were hindered throughout World War II by two main factors: constant attacks by the Germans in what were the largest ground campaigns and sieges in history—e.g., the battles for Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Kursk—and a lack of plutonium and uranium, and the United States had acquired large quantities of both. The Soviets created their first atomic bomb (modeled after "Fat Man," which the Americans had detonated over Nagasaki) on August 29, 1949. Both countries had realized that a hydrogen, thermonuclear weapon would be more potent than those using uranium or plutonium, and the Americans tested their first hydrogen bomb, "Ivy Mike" (photo, right), which was 450 times more powerful than "Fat Man," on November 1, 1952. The Soviets tested their first on August 12, 1953. Between 1955 and the early 1960s, the stockpile of combined American and Soviet nuclear bombs and missiles soared from 3,000 to more than 30,000. 

After both the Americans and Soviets had created Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, early on it would take these projectiles approximately 30 minutes to go from one country to the other. In mid-October 1962, the U.S. discovered that the Soviets were putting ICBMs in Cuba, just 90 miles south of the United States, and reducing the time a Russian missile could hit the U.S. from half an hour to about 5 minutes, leaving President  John F. Kennedy (and future Presidents) virtually no time to consider all retaliatory options. While many of his military advisors, including General Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, told Kennedy he should just bomb Cuba, Kennedy believed less aggressive measures needed to be taken. Kennedy, who had recently read Barbara Tuchman’s THE GUNS OF AUGUST, which emphasized how quickly the world’s largest countries rapidly descended into global conflict, knew that if he attacked Cuba, Chairman Nikita Khrushchev would have to retaliate. And, just as in August 1914, the situation would almost certainly escalate out of control. Instead of LeMay’s offensive operation, Kennedy ordered a blockade of Soviet ships heading toward Cuba to install more nuclear weapons in the country. He also demanded that Chairman Khrushchev have the existing missiles removed. 

As the Soviet ships neared the American naval blockade, the world held its breath to see if the vessels would indeed stop—or if they would go through, causing the Americans to sink them, which could spark a larger conflict. With tensions mounting, Kennedy received two letters from Khrushchev. The first, which seemed to have been written by Khrushchev himself, was conciliatory and sought to find common ground. But the second message, which came a day later, was far more bellicose and threatening. Kennedy’s advisors, caught off guard by the change in tone, weren’t certain how Kennedy should reply. His brother Bobby, the Attorney General, said to simply ignore the second letter and respond to the first. After back-channel negotiations, the Soviets finally agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba, and the U.S. would later remove nuclear weapons it had in Turkey. (There is considerable archival footage from this crisis, as well as White House recordings, including Kennedy's tense exchanges with Curtis LeMay.)

One of the most astonishing and even frightening aspects of the history of the American Presidency  and nuclear war is how haphazard and disorganized the protocols—or, more correctly, the lack of any—were for a President to launch a nuclear strike. In a memo to the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), President Kennedy asked the following questions: “1) Assuming that information from a closely guarded source causes me to conclude that the U.S. should launch an immediate nuclear strike against the Communist Bloc, does the JCS Emergency Actions File permit me to initiate such an attack without first consulting with the Secretary of Defense and/or Joint Chiefs of Staff? 2) If I called the Joint War Room without giving them advance notice, to whom would I be speaking? 3) What should I say to the Joint War Room to launch an immediate nuclear strike? 4) How would the person who received my instructions verify them?” After the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy had a direct link to the Kremlin installed in the White House, but contrary to public belief, neither Kennedy nor his successors ever had a physical "red phone." All messages were written and sent by text so that there would be no misunderstandings (which there could be in spoken conversation), and the first machine used to share these messages were called Teletypes (photo, right), followed by fax machines. Now any communiqués are sent via a secure form of email.

Kennedy and his advisors also came up with the idea of the “President’s Emergency Satchel” (nicknamed “The Football” because it was created in conjunction with a special military attack operation called “Dropkick”), so that when Presidents are away from the White House or other secure locations, they still have the means to launch a nuclear strike. Some of the contents of “The Football” have been de-classified, which should be emphasized in the show so that viewers don’t think that any top secret information is being revealed, but it is intriguing to learn what is inside the satchel. And there was a significant shift during Jimmy Carter's term in office as to how the various instructions inside"The Football" were presented to the President. Carter, who was literally a nuclear expert, having served in the U.S. Navy as an officer aboard a nuclear-powered submarine, thought that the instructions were far too complicated, especially considering the short period of time a President would have to make a momentous decision. Carter had the instructions simplified and accompanied with pictures, with some likening the final result to a “Denny’s Menu” that laid out the President’s options. Presidents are also given a laminated card (nicknamed “The Biscuit”), which lists the necessary authentication codes. There are numerous amusing (and also harrowing) stories the show could relate about the many times “The Football” and ‘The Biscuit” have been separated from the President.

The Cuban Missile Crisis made the public exponentially more aware of how much power American Presidents actually have and that this should be seriously considered in Presidential campaigns. During the 1964 race between Lyndon B. Johnson and Barry Goldwater, Johnson released, just once (it was so controversial, news programs re-aired it repeatedly, as the Johnson campaign had hoped), a commercial showing a little girl plucking petals off of a daisy and counting each one. Suddenly a male voice is heard counting from 10 to 1, as if for a missile launch, and then a nuclear bomb is seen exploding. Although Goldwater’s name wasn’t shown or mentioned, the implicit message of the commercial was that Goldwater was the kind of man either callous or unstable enough to start a nuclear war. The implication wasn’t totally unfounded, since Goldwater was publicly against the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and had floated the idea of using nuclear weapons in the ongoing war in Vietnam. Johnson defeated Goldwater in a landslide, and the ad demonstrated to future political candidates that “negative” ads could be extremely effective.

Near the end of President Harry S. Truman's time in office and especially during the Dwight D. Eisenhower era, the government began producing public service announcements showing people how to "duck and cover" and take other  safety measures in order to live through a nuclear blast. The Eisenhower administration also built an underground facility in Mount Weather, Virginia, where, ideally, both elected officials and senior White House advisors and the President could shelter to ensure a "continuity of government" in the event of a nuclear war. (Photo, right, shows where various officials would have their bunks and work stations, with the Oval Office, #701, at the very bottom.) On December 1, 1974, the Washington Post was the first media outlet to allude to the facility after a passenger plane accidentally crashed into the mountain. Although the facility is still active (and FEMA's offices are above it), the military decided that it would be better used in the event of a natural disaster, since the evacuation of hundreds of government individuals, by helicopter to a site 50 miles outside of Washington, was impractical. Scientists would also later determine that as few as 100 detonations of nuclear weapons would—through instant death, radiation poisoning, or long-term starvation due to a "nuclear winter"— kill every human being on earth. There are currently more than 13,000 of these weapons in the world today.

Although the "Would they or wouldn't they, start a nuclear conflict?" question was part of every Presidential election during the Cold War, it was especially front and center when Governor Ronald Reagan ran against President Jimmy Carter, whose supporters perceived Reagan as a "renegade cowboy" lacking international experience and who might, therefore, lead America into a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. Soon after coming into office, Reagan increased the military budget by an unprecedented 40%, with a focus on modernizing America's nuclear capabilities, and he was much more publicly critical of the Soviet Union than even his advisors might have preferred. Along with referring to the U.S.S.R. as "the Evil Empire," he jokingly said in a sound check before a radio speech that "Bombing [of the U.S.S.R.] begins in 5 minutes," prompting the Soviets to literally go on high alert. But by the end of his Presidency, the U.S. was actually on better terms with the Soviets—thanks also to the new Chairman, Mikhail Gorbachev—and the two leaders signed a treaty that reduced the number of nuclear weapons in the world. Reagan's perspective was also shifted, to some degree, after he was shot (photo, top right), which inspired him to think more deeply about his own mortality. While recovering, he sent a personal, handwritten letter (photo, bottom right, of the last graph of the letter) to one of Gorbachev's predecessors, Leonid Brezhnev, hoping they could achieve real peace. Reagan later remarked that he only received "an icy" reply, and the Cold War continued.

Since 1946, there have been more than 100 feature films and documentaries about the potential perils of a global nuclear war. Several of them have significantly impacted both public opinion and political policy, including "Dr. Strangelove or: How I Stopped Worrying and Came to Love the Bomb" and "Fail-Safe," both of which came out in 1964 (less than two years after the Cuban Missile Crisis). Also influential were the movies "War Games" and "The Day After,"  both of which came out in 1983, when relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were increasingly strained. "Dr. Strangelove" stars Peter Sellers (who plays three roles, including the President of the United States and the eponymous Dr. Strangelove), Slim Pickens (photo, top right), and George C. Scott (photo, bottom right), who plays a hawkish general modeled after Curtis LeMay. Although the film ends with the entire world blowing up due to a Soviet "Doomsday Machine" (which is meant to satirize the whole idea of "Mutual Assured Destruction" or "MAD"), the movie is a comedy. In fact, the American Film Institute has ranked "Dr. Strangelove" as the 3rd funniest American film ever made.

In stark contrast to "Dr. Strangelove," "Fail-Safe" is a much darker and more serious film, starring Henry Fonda as the President of the United States facing a military crisis. The point of the film (and the ironic title) is that, when it comes to nuclear weapons, there really are no absolute "fail-safe" measures. The pilot of the bomber (photo, top right), whose actions ultimately result in the destruction of Moscow and a retaliatory strike on New York City, is locked in an inflexible mindset that doesn't allow for rational, common sense decision making. In one of the more dramatic scenes in the film, the military brings in the pilot's wife (photo, bottom right)—and this is after the President has directly but unsuccessfully commanded him to return to the U.S.—to implore him that the mission has been called off and not to bomb Moscow. Although clearly torn, the pilot obstinately proceeds with his initial instructions, leading to the deaths of millions of people. 

Whether or not scenes from "War Games" are shown at the beginning of "DEFCON 1," the film actually plays a critical role in American history and deserves some attention. What makes it especially concerning is that it shows a young computer geek name David Lightman, played by Matthew Broderick, easily hacking into NORAD and initiating what he innocently believes is a theoretical game of "Thermonuclear War"—but actually sets in motion a potential full-scale nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. (Although Lightman's use of a dial-up phone modem dates the film, "War Games" was actually quite prescient about matters of cybersecurity and the dangers of automated A.I., with no human control.) After President Reagan watched the movie at a private screening, he later asked his top military advisors, “Could something like this really happen? Could someone break into our most sensitive computers?” Much to Reagan's shock, the answer was "Yes," and this led to a significant overhaul of how military computers could be accessed and also the passing of the first anti-hacking legislation. There are many other smaller but still interesting details about the film, such as the fact that the Hollywood-created version of NORAD's interior (photo, top right) was larger and more impressive than the real one (photo, bottom right). NORAD refused to let the production company film inside their command center, or even share images of it at the time, so the director and his design crew simply tried to imagine what it might look like. Also, and on a more tragic note, the musician John Lennon was reading for the role of the computer genius Stephen Falken but was murdered in New York City on December 8, 1980, before filming began. (The part went to the British actor John Wood, who was also the voice of "Joshua.")

On November 20, 1983, "The Day After," aired, showing what an actual nuclear war would look like. The build-up to the broadcast was so widespread that 100 million Americans tuned in, representing almost half of the country's population and demonstrating a record audience for a made-for-TV film. Many people were too afraid to see it alone, so they created "watch groups" to view it with others. And, indeed, it was extremely graphic, showing men, women, and children burned alive and incinerated by nuclear blasts (photo, top right). Local news stations across the country (photo, bottom right) reported on how people reacted to the movie and even set up toll-free hotlines with grief and trauma counselors. Immediately after the movie aired, there was a live program hosted by Ted Koppel that featured prominent Americans, such as Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, and Robert McNamara, along with Carl Sagan and William F. Buckley, who had an especially spirited debate about whether MAD was preventing a nuclear war or would lead to one. Like "War Games," "They Day After" affected America's nuclear policies. President Ronald Reagan saw the movie and said, in his memoirs, that it had a direct impact on his desire to reach out to Mikhail Gorbachev and reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the world, which they did.

On September 26, 1983, a Soviet Air Defense lieutenant colonel named Stanislav Petrov (photo, right) was responsible for monitoring his country's early-warning radar system, when an alarm went off and the command center screen lit up showing five ICBMs launched in the United States and heading for Russia. Petrov's orders were to relay any such information to the Kremlin so they could prepare a counter-strike. But (unlike the pilot in "Fail-Safe") Petrov considered the situation objectively and couldn't believe that the U.S. would just send five missiles if they really intended to defeat the Soviets in a nuclear war. Once missiles were airborne, the Soviet leader Yuri Andropov would only have 12 minutes to retaliate, so every second counted. Petrov was convinced the computers had made a mistake, so he called his superiors to report a false alarm—and then waited. After the 12 minutes passed and no other warning systems indicated an attack, Petrov knew he had made the right decision. This incident is one of 16, over the course of the Cold War, in which the two countries almost engaged in a full-scale, thermonuclear war due either to computer malfunctions or human error. Once the story about Petrov was released to the public 15 years after it happened, he was lauded for his actions around the world, except in his home country; Russia gave him no recognition whatsoever, and he died alone in a small apartment in Moscow. His colleagues, however, had chipped in to buy him a new TV set. 

Surprisingly, whether interviewed during their term in office or afterwards, Presidents have rarely discussed in much detail what it was like to receive the nuclear codes and the enormous weight of having the ability to end the world. (Even President Trump conceded that it was a "humbling moment.") There are many other questions about this experience and power to ask former Presidents (and, ideally, the current one): "What was that moment like, of receiving the codes and instructions on how to launch a global, thermonuclear war? Once you were given the codes, did you immediately start to wonder if you could truly launch an attack (or retaliation), which could lead to a full-scale exchange and the end of life as we know it on this planet? Or is the mere idea of this so overwhelming that you essentially put off even the thought of it until a crisis seemed to be growing? Did you speak with former Presidents about this responsibility? Do you think one person should have this much power?" Because, again, Presidents haven't really delved into this subject as extensively as might be expected, this show could make history by revealing their true thoughts.

For the last part of the show, many of the experts, including the former Presidents, could discuss whether they think that Vladimir Putin might, first, use tactical nuclear weapons as a demonstration of strength and/or for strategic purposes in Ukraine or elsewhere. And second, if such actions led to a larger war, is he prepared to engage in a full-scale nuclear exchange, which could possibly lead to the end of humanity? In an interview with the U.K.'s "Express," Putin acknowledged that a massive nuclear retaliation by the Russians would “be a global catastrophe, a catastrophe for the entire world," but he then concluded on this chilling note: "Do we need such a world without Russia? [And] we would be victims of an aggression and would get to heaven as martyrs." Experts could also weigh in on the fact that, if Putin has even a nominal "win" in Ukraine, perhaps securing the Donbas region, would he feel emboldened to expand this conflict into, for example, a country like Moldova and threaten Poland, which could also spark a larger war? No one knows the definitive answers, but it's important for the country to be asking and thinking about these questions. [End of proposal.]